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   1
European Integration Model: 







Under the stimulus provided by the formation of the European Economic Community in 
1957, interest on economic integration spread particularly to less developed countries 
(LDCs) during the early 1960s. Most of the regional integration arrangements signed by 
then by these countries failed to match expectations. By contrast, regional integration efforts 
in Western Europe were in general more successful. 
 
  In the 1970s and early 1980s the slowdown in the European integration process and 
the failure of similar regional initiatives in the Third World led to a decline of integration 
theory and praxis. After this decline, regionalism has made an impressive comeback around 
the world. The increasing creation of formal structures of regional integration around the 
world has led to distinguish between the new regionalism of the present and the old 
regionalism of the 1960s.  
 
  Despite the problems raised in the past, recent economic policy debate in LDCs has 
been characterized by a renewed interest in subregional economic integration as a means of 
stimulating growth and confronting the challenges posed by the increased regionalism in 
world trading system. In Central America a new attempt has been made to revitalize the 
Central American Common Market (CACM) created in 1960 by Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The new integration scheme is still subject to 
numerous limitations hampering the effective encouragement of the Central American 
economic development. The objective of this paper is to compare the new CACM with 
the successful experience of economic integration in the European Union (EU), drawing 
lessons that may serve to overcome its current limitations. 
 
  The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. The first section examines the 
theoretical basis of the European model of economic integration, identifying the main 
components which may contribute to explain the rationale of economic integration 
among LDCs under  the old and new regionalism. The second section explores the major 
features acquired by this European model of economic integration in its implementation, 
paying particular attention to its legal and institutional system and its set of common 
actions and policies. After presenting the theory and praxis of the European integration 
model, the third section carries out a comparison between the EU and the new CACM, 
taking into account the prevailing structural differences between both regions. The fourth 
section ends the paper with the major conclusions drawn from that comparison. 
 
 
   2
The theoretical basis of the European economic integration: relevance to the 
rationale of regional integration among less developed countries 
 
Economic integration is a process aiming at abolishing discrimination between domestic 
and foreign goods, services and factors of production.
1 Typically this process runs 
through four stages: free trade area, customs union, common market and economic and 
monetary union. A free trade area involves the removal of tariffs between member 
countries on their reciprocal trade in goods and services, and the maintenance of the 
respective national tariffs towards non-member countries. When in addition to liberalize 
trade among member countries, these levy a common external tariff (CET) against third 
countries, a customs union is formed. A common market possesses all the elements of a 
customs union plus the free movement of the factors of production among the member 
countries. Finally, a common market in which the major micro- and macroeconomic 
policies of the member countries are harmonized under supranational control and in 
which a single currency is adopted, leads to an economic and monetary union. 
 
  The study of this process of economic integration has produced a substantial 
theoretical literature. Although integration schemes among LDCs have been the most 
numerous, the theoretical developments on economic integration have been biased 
largely towards the study of the problems of integration in the developed countries of 
Western Europe. This section provides an overview of the principal directions taken by 
this theoretical research, paying special attention to those contributions more relevant to 
understand the rationale of economic integration among LDCs under the old regionalism 
(the first part of the section) and the new regionalism (the second part of the section). As 
most economic integration initiatives in the Third World have not gone, at best, beyond 
an attempt of integrating the national markets of the participating countries without 
hardly harmonizing their economic policies, the theoretical literature reviewed in this 
section is that on product market integration, i.e. on customs unions. 
 
 
Rationale under the old regionalism 
 
There is a consensus on crediting Jacob Viner’s
2 pioneering distinction between trade 
creation and trade diversion with opening up the branch of the theory of international 
trade devoted to economic integration. By introducing the concepts of trade creation and 
trade diversion, Viner showed that it is not possible to generalize about the welfare 
consequences of a customs union. He accepted that its formation would augment trade 
between the member countries following the elimination of tariffs on their mutual trade, 
but he argued that no general judgment could be made as to whether this increased trade 
would improve or worsen welfare, since this depended on the source of that increased 
trade. Viner distinguished between two possible cases: trade creation and trade diversion. 
In the first case, there is a replacement of high-cost domestic production by lower-cost 
                                                           
1 See: Bela Balassa, “Economic Integration” in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, ed. John 
Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman, 43-47 (London: Macmillan, 1987). 
2 Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950).   3
imports from a partner country and hence, an increase in welfare. In the second case, the 
replacement is of low-cost imports from a non-member country by higher-cost imports 
from a partner country, and welfare is reduced. Accordingly, the net welfare effects of the 
customs union depend on the relative incidence of trade creation and trade diversion. 
 
  After Viner’s fundamental breakthrough, however, economic integration theory 
has made only limited progress. The lack of a satisfactory framework for analyzing the 
dynamic effects of economic integration has undermined advance in this field. The recent 
incorporation of imperfect competition and product differentiation into economic 
integration theory has opened new possibilities and may contribute to a better 
understanding of integration in the contemporary economic context.
3 
 
  The traditional theory of economic integration, centered on the static effects of 
resource reallocation of the customs unions, suggests that there is hardly scope for a 
beneficial process of economic integration among LDCs. The conditions found in the 
majority of these countries prior to integration –the Central American countries are a 
clear example– are  precisely the opposite to those indicated by the theory for favoring 
trade creation: their external trade is important relative to their domestic production, the 
proportion of that external trade conducted with prospective partners is relatively low, 
their structures of production and resource endowments are similar,
4 and so on. In the 
light of these conditions, LDCs appear as the most unlikely candidates for membership of 
a welfare-increasing customs union. 
 
  The criteria for static welfare gains are of limited value to assess the arguments 
for economic integration among LDCs.
5 The circumstances of these countries are quite 
different from those ones prevailing in the developed countries of Western Europe, from 
which the orthodox theory of economic integration has evolved. While the LDCs are 
attempting to build up their industrial base and face serious structural distortions, the 
advanced European economies are already industrialized and suffer from much less 
distortions. 
 
                                                           
3 Useful guides to the development of the literature on customs union theory are provided by: Richard G. 
Lipsey, “The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey” Economic Journal 70 (1960): 496-513; 
Melvyn B. Krauss, “Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory: An Interpretive Survey” Journal of 
Economic Literature 10, no. 2 (1972): 413-436; Frank R. Gunter, “Customs Union Theory: Retrospect and 
Prospect” in Economic Aspects of Regional Trading Arrangements, ed. David Greenaway, Thomas Hyclak 
and Robert J. Thornton, 1-30 (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989); Robert C. Hine, “International 
Economic Integration” in Surveys in International Trade, ed. David Greenaway and L. Alan Winters, 234-
272 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Ali M. El-Agraa,  “International Economic Integration” in Current Issues 
in International Trade, ed. David Greenaway, 174-221 (London: Macmillan, 1996). 
4 Those countries being initially competitive in production but potentially complementary, may give  rise to 
a net trade creating customs union. The probability that this happens depends on the level of development 
of the economies involved. In the case of regional integration schemes among LDCs, most of the 
participating economies are competitive, but not potentially complementary. Their low level of 
development accounts for the low potential for sectoral changes towards complementarity in the short run. 
5 See: Tayseer A. Jaber, “The Relevance of Traditional Integration Theory to Less Developed Countries” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 9, no. 3 (1970): 254-267.   4
  The basic rationale for economic integration among LDCs is a dynamic one. 
Regional integration arrangements are viewed as a means for accelerating the growth 
rates of the economies participating and for promoting their long-run development. In 
this dynamic context of growth and development, integration schemes may contribute to 
create economic conditions to overcome structural problems of the LDCs, primarily those 




  Most of the integration initiatives launched in the 1960s in the Third World –
among them, the CACM– aimed  at encouraging industrialization through import 
substitution. When the domestic markets of LDCs proved to be too small to allow an 
efficient import-substituting industrialization (ISI), the establishment of a protected 
regional market –i.e. the formation of a customs union– was advocated as an effective 
alternative to reduce the costs of the ISI. These integration schemes were justified on the 
basis of the infant industry argument for protection applied at the regional level. 
 
  The customs unions among LDCs created to foster the development of import 
substituting industries are initially bound to be net trade diverting, since those industries 
supply a regional demand previously satisfied by imports from the rest of the world. The 
formation of these customs unions, however, is not irrational. Charles Cooper and Benton 
Massell,
7 and Harry Johnson
8 first provided an economic rationality for explaining them. 
LDCs consider industrialization as a rational social choice because they believe that it 
can give rise to substantial external economies or lead to an acceleration of economic 
growth. Given this social preference for industrialization, LDCs are willing to sacrifice 
some national income by not importing from the cheapest available source or/and by 
specializing in activities in which they do not possess static comparative advantages. 
Anything, such as the establishment of a customs union, lowering the cost of realizing the 
social preference for industrialization via import substitution, increases welfare and 
contributes to the countries’ development. A policy of economic integration among LDCs 
can, therefore, be justified, even if the standard conditions for static trade creation do not 
exist. 
 
  To the extent that the limited size of the national markets constrains economic 
development in some LDCs, the market integration may become a useful instrument for 
                                                           
6 On the long-term dynamic rationale for economic integration among LDCs, see: Germánico Salgado-
Peñaherrera, “Viable Integration and the Economic Co-operation Problems of the Developing World” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 19, no. 1 and no. 2 (1980): 65-76 (Part One) and 175-188 (Part Two); 
Peter Robson, The Economics of International Integration (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), Ch. 11; Rolf 
J. Langhammer and Ulrich Hiemenz, Regional Integration among Developing Countries: Opportunities, 
Obstacles and Options (Tübingen: Mohr, 1990); Robert C. York, Regional Integration and Developing 
Countries (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1993). 
7 Charles A. Cooper and  Benton F. Massell, “Towards a General Theory of Customs Union in Developing 
Countries”  Journal of Political Economy 73, no. 5 (1965): 461-476. 
8 Harry G. Johnson, “An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining and the Formation of 
Customs Unions”  Journal of Political Economy 73, no. 3 (1965): 256-283.   5
easing such constraint.
9 By encouraging a more rational division of labor among member 
countries and more optimum plants installations, the increased size of the regional market 
may facilitate the achievement of benefits based on intraregional specialization and on 
economies of scale. For the infant economies of the Third World, an intraregional 
division of labor within a customs union is expected to be more consistent with the 
comparative advantages of member countries without exposing their economies to the 
competition in world markets. Likewise, regional integration provides the opportunity for 
industries operating below optimum capacity to take advantages of economies of large-
scale production made possible by the extended regional market. 
 
  Other economic arguments for regional integration arrangements among LDCs 
are included in the literature.
10 The most common ones maintain that economic 
integration may enable the joint production of public goods (physical infrastructure, 
public services, training and research, etc.), expand the volume of foreign private 
investment being more attracted to a regional market instead of several national markets, 
reduce the external vulnerability of LDCs dependent on commodity exports, and increase 
the collective bargaining power in the external economic relations. 
 
  All the analyzed arguments have not been modified substantially under the new 
regionalism. The basic long-term dynamic rationale for economic integration among 
LDCs remains the same, but the environment in which the new schemes have been 
launched is different from the one prevailing in the past. This fact has led –as it is shown 
next– to the arguments basing integration schemes to incorporate the new regionalism’s 
changes of emphasis with respect to the approach to economic integration.  As a result of 
the changes in the development strategies pursued by LDCs, there has been a shift towards a 
more outward-oriented and market-driven approach to economic integration. Likewise, in a 
world trading system tending towards major blocs, integration schemes among LDCs are 
also viewed as an instrument for entering into regional trading arrangements with large 
developed countries to ensure future access to their markets. 
 
 
Rationale under the new regionalism 
 
After a decline in the 1970s and the early 1980s, regionalism has reemerged as world wide 
phenomenon. Diverse developments in North America and Europe in the middle 1980s 
explain much of the upsurge of interest in integration initiatives. The United States (US), 
disappointed by the slow progress at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
negotiations, decided to conclude a bilateral free trade agreement with Canada and to 
commence, together with this country, trade talks with Mexico for the completion of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement. The US also announced its intention to negotiate 
free trade areas with groups of other Latin American countries under the Enterprise for the 
                                                           
9 On this argument, see: Staffan Burenstan Linder, “Customs Unions and Economic Development” in Latin 
American Economic Integration, ed. Miguel S. Wionczek (New York: Praeger, 1966); F. Kahnert, P. 
Richards, E. Stoutjesdijk and P. Thomopoulos, Economic Integration Among Developing Countries (Paris: 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1969). 
10 See: Langhammer and Hiemenz, op. cit.; York, op. cit..   6
Americas Initiative. Alongside this, the European integration process started to widen and 
deepen. The conclusion in mid-1980s of negotiations to expand the European Community 
towards Portugal and Spain coincided with the laying of plans for the implementation of the 
Single European Market and the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
  The increased regional integration in the world’s two largest trading areas and the 
failure in December 1990 to conclude the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations 
on schedule, led other countries to reconsider the regional alternative. While continuing to 
express support for the multilateral trading system, many countries began to explore options 
for increasing regional cooperation and integration as the way to meet the challenge posed 
by the developments in North America and Europe. As a result, in the early 1990s an 
increasing regionalization process of the world economy began,
11 continuing until 
nowadays.  
 
  In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, this process of regionalization 
has led to the signing of two types of economic integration arrangements. Firstly, there 
exists a great number of plurilateral and bilateral agreements that only pursue to establish 
a free trade area in which goods and investments can circulate without restrictions. Most 




  The second type of  arrangements seeks to go deeply into the process of economic 
integration, beyond a simple free trade area. They aim at turning successively, into 
customs unions, common markets and economic and monetary unions. In this group four 
subregional integration arrangements are included: the CACM, the Caribbean 
Community, the Andean Community of Nations and the Common Market of the South. 
While the three first ones are a revitalization of integration schemes already existing, the 
Common Market of the South was formed in 1991 after the signing of the Treaty of 
Asuncion by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. All these 
subregional integration schemes are presently imperfect CUs.
13 
 
  The proliferation of subregional trading arrangements around the world suggests that 
the world trading system may be evolving towards three major trading blocs built around the 
US (encompassing the Americas), the EU (encompassing most of Europe) and Japan 
(encompassing most of East Asia). Some view this development as a positive move towards 
a less fragmented world trading system. It is maintained that this new regionalism may 
speed up the global trade liberalization process as multilateral trade talks may be conducted 
better among a less number of negotiating parties. Others, on the contrary, fear that these 
                                                           
11 For a complete list of the regional integration arrangements signed in the early 1990s, see: Augusto de la 
Torre and Margaret R. Kelly, Regional Trade Arrangements, IMF Occasional Paper no. 93 (Washington, 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1992), Tables 1 and 2. 
12 On this kind of agreements intending to be a part of the FTAA, see: Antoni Estevadeordal, Dani Rodrik, 
Alan M. Taylor and Andrés Velasco (eds.), Integrating the Americas: FTAA and Beyond (Cambridge, 
Mass.: David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University Press, 2004). 
13 See: Fernando Rueda-Junquera, “Integración económica latinoamericana: balance y perspectivas” 
Boletín Económico de Información Comercial Española, no. 2703 (2001): 17-25.   7
trading blocs may turn inward-looking undermining multilateralism. It is argued that once a 
trading bloc is large enough, the need to be open to extra-bloc countries is reduced.
14 
 
  The question of whether new regionalism and multilateralism are conflicting or 
complementary processes is basically an empirical one. After the signing of the Uruguay 
Round agreement in April 1994 and the coming into force of the new World Trade 
Organization (WTO) substituting the GATT in January 1995, the protectionist danger 
seemed to recede. However, the last WTO ministerial conferences and the development of 
the Doha Round have revealed that the WTO capacity for ensuring that the new regionalism 
is open and supportive of multilateral liberalization still has to be tested.  
 
  In evaluating the recent wave of regional trading arrangements, it must be taken into 
consideration that the old regionalism of the 1960s was different from the new one in three 
important aspects.
15 First, the US was then firmly committed to promoting multilateralism 
and did not endorse regionalism except in the case of the European Economic Community. 
Second, the developing and communist countries embracing the integrationist approach, 
used it to encourage an inward-looking and state-led ISI strategy at the regional level. Third, 
economic integration arrangements involved countries with relatively similar income per 
capita levels, i.e. regional integration was of the North-North and South-South type. 
 
  Under the new regionalism the aforementioned features have changed. The US has 
commenced to support regional integration not only in North America, but also in a wider 
hemispheric and Pacific context.
16 Jagdish Bhagwati
17 argues that this US support is the 
single most important reason why regionalism is making a comeback and is likely to be 
more durable than the regionalism of the 1960s. On the other hand, development strategies 
in developing and communist countries have been radically reappraised in favor of outward-
looking and market-led economies. Finally, the new regional integration initiatives have 
often taken the form of North-South schemes including partners from the developed and 
developing world. 
                                                           
14  The different views and arguments on this debate can be found in: Kym Anderson and Richard 
Blackhurst (eds.), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1993); Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds.), New Dimensions in Regional Integration 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Vincent Cable and David Henderson (eds.), Trade Blocs 
?: The Future of Regional Integration (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994); World 
Bank, Trade, Regionalism and Development, Global Economic Prospects 2005 (Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank, 2005). 
15 See: Vincent Cable, “Overview” in  Trade Blocs ?: The Future of Regional Integration, ed. Vincent 
Cable and David Henderson, 1-16 (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994).  
16 The US proposal for a hemispheric free trade area –the FTAA– was launched for the first time by 
President Bush in 1990 as the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. After certain lethargy, this proposal 
reemerged in the first Summit of the Americas held in Miami, US, in December 1994 and it has been 
maintained in the subsequent Summits held in Santiago, Chile, in 1998, in Quebec, Canada, in 2001, and in 
Mar del Plata, Argentina, in 2005. Likewise, the US joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
proposal launched in November 1994, aiming at establishing a free trade zone in the Pacific basin.  
17 Jagdish Bhagwati, “Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview” in New Dimensions in Regional 
Integration, ed. Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, 22-51 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993).    8
 
  Two of these new features reveal a change of emphasis with respect to the approach 
to economic integration among LDCs. The basic rationale for LDCs economic integration 
remains a dynamic one, i.e. economic integration viewed as a means for accelerating the 
growth rates of the economies participating. However, integration schemes among LDCs 
have had to modify some of their old goals in order to adapt to the new conditions of 
growing economic globalization. Most of these schemes –including the new CACM–
18 no 
longer have as their primary objective the ISI and neither do they seek to be formed 
exclusively from partners with comparable levels of development. 
 
  The new initiatives at regional integration among LDCs go beyond a revival of the 
integration schemes launched in the 1960s to extend domestic ISI policies at the regional 
level. Most LDCs, as a part of their national stabilization and adjustment programs, have 
adopted similar trade liberalization and deregulation policies. This has led to a new outward-
oriented and market-driven approach to economic integration. This approach aims at making 
integration policies compatible with, and complementary to, policies to enhance 
international competitiveness.
19 Economic integration can provide both demand-pull and 
supply-push mechanisms, i.e. it can contribute not only to expand domestic demand, but 
also to upgrade the sources of competitiveness of the participating countries’ exports. 
 
  In addition to being an instrument for a more competitive insertion in the global 
economy, integration schemes among LDCs are now viewed as a means for ensuring future 
access to developed countries markets. LDCs have began to fear that their access to world 
markets may be curtailed considerably if the three trading blocs indicated above become a 
reality and they are left out. For this reason, they are seeking to enter into regional 
integration arrangements with large developed countries. Many of the subregional processes 
of economic integration among LDCs, specially those ones among LDCs with little 
                                                           
18 On the new regionalism in Central America, see: Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), Integración regional en 
Centroamérica (San José: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales / Social Science Research 
Council, 1998); Fernando Rueda-Junquera, La reactivación del Mercado Común Centroamericano 
(Burgos: Servicio de Publicaciones, Universidad de Burgos, 1999); Klaus Bodemer and Eduardo Gamarra 
(eds.), Centroamérica 2020: un nuevo modelo de desarrollo regional (Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 
2002); SGSICA-CEPAL (Secretaría General del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana – Comisión 
Económica de las Naciones Unidas para América Latina y el Caribe),  La integración centroamericana: 
beneficios y costos (San Salvador and México: SGSICA-CEPAL, 2004); Fernando Rueda-Junquera, 
“Prospects for the Central American Customs Union” in The European Union and Regional Integration: A 
Comparative Perspective and Lessons for the Americas, ed. Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domínguez, 113-134 
(Miami: Jean Monnet Chair University of Miami, 2005). 
19 For this reason, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean designates 
this approach as open regionalism too; see: ECLA (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean), Open Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic Integration as a 
Contribution to Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity (Santiago: ECLA, 1994). For more details on 
the theory and praxis of new (open) regionalism in LDCs, see: De Melo and Panagariya, op. cit.; Cable and 
Henderson, op. cit.;  Sheila Page, Regionalism among Developing Countries (London: Macmillan, 2000); 
IADB (Inter-American Development Bank), Beyond Borders: The New Regionalism in Latin America, 
Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 2002 Report (Washington D.C.: IADB, 2002); Maurice 
Schiff and Alan Winters, Regional Integration and Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003); World Bank, op. cit..   9
bargaining power, are intended to be a part of larger integration efforts involving –unlike 
past initiatives– both developing and developed country partners. In the case of most Latin 
American integration schemes, their ultimate purpose is to sign a free trade agreement 
with the US. 
 
 
The praxis of the European economic integration: major features  of the European 
experience 
 
As it has been shown in the preceding section, the traditional theory of customs unions 
has been of limited value to assess the arguments for economic integration among LDCs. 
However, in the case of the European countries it has provided sound arguments for 
establishing a regional integration scheme in Europe. The effective implementation of 
this scheme has shaped the current European model of economic integration, through 
three essential components: the political commitment, the legal and institutional system, 
and the set of common actions and policies in favor of integration. Next, these three 
components are examined. 
 
 
Political commitment as a basic precondition 
 
The successful evolution of the European integration scheme suggests that the 
political commitment is a basic precondition which must be fulfilled in order for 
integration scheme to achieve the positive effects identified by the economic integration 
theory. Regional integration requires a strong political commitment on the part of the 
participating governments to advance towards common objectives. It is not enough to 
have a strong motivation in the initial stages, but the commitment must be sustained over 
a long period. It is worthwhile noting that the European integration process has been in 
construction for almost half a century now. The most remarkable feature in this regard 
has been the irreversible nature of progress accomplished thanks to that strong and 
sustained political commitment. 
 
 
Legal and institutional system 
 
Although the EU is a mainly economic regional integration process, it is 
necessary to point out that also this process is based on the law. After the Maastricht 
Treaty a clear distinction has been drawn between European Community law and EU 
law. While the former is highly supranational, the latter is considered much less 
supranational, since it also includes the areas pertaining to the EU’s second- and third-
pillar. The vast majority of EU activity –and particularly, the economics of the European 
integration (the EU’s first-pillar)– is encompassed by the Community law, that is, it is 
subject to a supranational legal system. 
 
Community law is characterized by two major features: its primacy and its direct 
applicability. The primacy on the national legal systems ensures that Community law  10
cannot be altered by national, regional or local laws in any Member State. The direct 
applicability to Member States means that Community law is binding on them.  Having 
the force of law in Member States, Community law can be fully and uniformly applicable 
throughout the EU. 
 
The two aforementioned characteristics explain that Community law has become 
an important mechanism of regional integration, since it has given rise to a gradual 
approach of the national legislations and at the same time, it has contributed to create a 
common legal system.This integration through law has been made possible because –and 
this is specially pertinent to the subsequent comparison with the Central American case– 
EU’s Member States have proceeded in accordance with the law, complying with the 
commitments signed in the Treaties (Primary Law) and introducing the binding rules 
(Secondary Law). 
 
Not only the common legal system has supported integration efforts in Europe, 
but also the establishment of common institutions endowed with a supranational decision 
making power, a clear mandate and a certain amount of automatically available financial 
resources.
 20 These institutions have helped the European integration scheme to pursue 
clearly identified regional interests rather than the sometimes conflicting interests of 
different Member States. 
 
Common institutions have acquired a supranational nature thanks to the partial 
transfer of sovereignty from Member States to them, making possible that these 
institutions have operated appropriately. Both management and decision making powers 
have been transferred to these institutions, in such a way that a great part of their actions 
has binding character on the Member States. Therefore, operating common institutions 
has been a shared sovereignty exercise. This fact has led to these institutions have played 
an essential role in strengthening the integration process, since their operation have 
allowed consolidating the idea of supranationality. 
 
The transfer of sovereignty has not been uniform in all the areas. While in some of 
them it has been far-reaching (e.g. in agricultural and monetary matters), in others it has 
been practically non-existent (e.g. in taxation and social issues). Institutions have had 
their scope limited to those powers assigned to them by the Treaty on EU or derived from 
its implementation. 
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Dimension in EU Integration” in The European Union: Economics and Policies, ed. Ali M. El-Agraa, 49-
71 (Harlow: Financial Times – Prentice Hall, 2001); J. Peterson and M. Shackleton, The Institutions of the 
European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Francisco J. Fonseca Morillo, “Reformas de la 
arquitectura institutional y del proceso de toma de decisiones institucionales en el Tratado por el que se 
establece una Constitución para Europa” in Logros, iniciativas y retos institucionales y económicos: la 
Unión Europea del siglo XXI, ed. Isabel Vega Mocoroa, 33-59 (Valladolid: Lex Nova, 2005); Amparo 
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The principle of  subsidiarity has been useful in defining the mandates of the 
common institutions and dividing tasks between them and Member States. In line with 
this principle, the responsibility of dealing with an issue has been kept as close to the 
population concerned as possible. The responsibility has shifted to a higher  Community 
level only if the issue has been able to be more effectively handled at that regional level. 
This has implied that common institutions have not been involved with matters which 
have been best dealt with by the Member States themselves. 
 
In addition to create common institutions, the European integration scheme has 
financed them on a joint basis endowing them with a relative budget independence.
21 
This has allowed them to reach a certain degree of autonomy, indispensable to carry out 
their activities without depending completely on the Member States’ will. 
 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that the legal and institutional framework for 
regional integration in Europe has been sufficiently flexible to allow adaptation to 
changing historical circumstances. This has made possible to accomplish advances on the 
integration process, which have been slow, but irreversible. The European process has 
just taken those steps being acceptable by all the Member States, while  those decisions 
on issues without consensus have been postponed. It has never attempted to go faster than 
historical circumstances have permitted. 
 
This European integration framework has not only allowed to agree what it was 
possible in each historical moment, but also it has taken into account the different speeds 
of progress at a subregional level. The European experience has showed that it is 
unrealistic to expect all the Member States to move along at the same pace, unless it is 
accepted that the pace is that of the slowest moving Member State. This situation has 
tended to become more complex as the number of participating countries has increased, 
making more difficult the process of achieving common policies. 
 
The principle of variable geometry has enabled a limited number of Member 
States –which has been willing and able to advance further– to deepen integration process 
within the single institutional framework of the EU. The application of this principle 
involves the prior existence of a group of Member States with ability to take over the 
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Common actions and policies encouraging integration 
 
  The final part of this section centers on the analysis of the common actions and 
policies developed by the EU in favor of the economic integration. The interest in 
economic aspects is due to three reasons. Firstly, the main objective of the paper is to 
know how regional integration can be made a successful instrument of social and 
economic development in Central America in the light of the European experience. 
Secondly, the economic dimension has been the prevailing one in the European 
integration process; so far, only the advances in the economic integration have managed 
to materialize in sound and permanent accomplishments. Finally, the European 
experience has showed how economic integration has been used as a direct means to 
achieve economic objectives and as an indirect means to deal with non-economic 
objectives of great significance in the European construction, such as the pacification 
after the Second World War and the gradual political integration overcoming destructive 
nationalisms. 
 
The EU has pursued the social and economic development of the Members States 
by means of the integration of  their national markets, the establishment of a single 
currency and the implementation of measures reducing the internal differences in the 
integrated market. Common actions and policies taken in this area has aimed at the 
economic liberalization (ensuring the free movement of goods, services, persons and 
capital), the introduction of the euro and the internal cohesion.
22 The singularity of this 
European approach to the economic integration arises from the fact that there has been an 
option for the economic liberalization as a way to boost welfare, but accompanied by 
redistributive policies intended for favoring the approximation of the levels of welfare. 
 
 
Comparing integration schemes: implications for economic integration in Central 
America 
 
After presenting the main theoretical and practical characteristics of the European 
integration model, this section is devoted to compare the new CACM with the European 
model examined. The comparison is focused on three relevant issues: the political 
commitment, the legal and institutional system, and the common actions and policies.  
 
 
Comparing the political commitment 
 
Unlike the European experience, the regional integration process in Central 
America has been distinguished by its lack of a strong and sustained political 
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commitment. This has usually arisen from actual or perceived conflict between national 
and regional objectives. When this has happened, the Central American governments 
have given priority to the former. The political will to implement agreed measures, share 
sovereignty, accept the short-term costs of integration and allocate financial resources to 
burden-sharing mechanisms has been quite insufficient. To face this situation it is 




Comparing the legal and institutional system 
 
The Central American Integration System (Sistema de la Integración 
Centroamericana, SICA) is the new institutional framework created by the 1991 Protocol 
of Tegucigalpa to reactivate the CACM. Compared with the EU’s legal and institutional 
system, this new framework presents five major limitations.
23 
 
Firstly, the institutional scheme develops immersed in a remarkable legal disorder. 
There are no homogeneous and compulsory deadlines for the national ratification of the 
agreements signed, what causes delays in their entry into force or the partial entry into 
force for only some member countries. For example, Costa Rica has not ratified the 1986 
Constitutive Treaty of the Central American Parliament. Likewise, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala and Panama have not ratified the 1992 Statute of the Central American Court 
of Justice. 
 
Secondly, the essentially intergovernmental conception of the new institutional 
framework makes that the decision taking power is concentrated on the Summit of 
Central American Presidents, which is the SICA highest ranking organization. The high 
political commitment level of the Presidential Summits is decisive in the first years of an 
integration process, but it can limit its deepening. The political consensus of the 
governments will be strongly conditioned by each member country’s specific political 
situations, which can slow down and hinder the regional integration process. 
 
If the consolidation and deepening of the new CACM is wished, facing an 
increasing number of conflicts in trade matters as well as in harmonization and 
production factors movement issues, will be inevitable. In this context,  it will be 
necessary to provide the regional integration scheme with supranational institutional 
mechanisms having sufficient decision-making and financing capacity to remove rapidly 
obstacles arising on the path towards a greater integration. 
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Thirdly, the construction of the integration process from the political 
encouragement of the Central American presidents has been carried out without existing 
a clear group of countries with effective ability to take over the regional leadership of the 
integration process. Although El Salvador and Guatemala have tried to play this role, 
they have not had a substantial impact on the regional integration dynamics. 
 
Fourthly, governments have hardly complied with commitments signed in the 
Presidential Summits. This fact has slowed down the integration process, subtracting it 
credibility and legitimacy in the civil society. 
 
Finally, the fifth limitation of the new regional institutional scheme lies in its 
excessive complexity and high number of institutions, as a consequence of a formal 
integration process with overambitious objectives. This not only has conditioned 
institutions’ effectiveness, but also has ended up causing a serious funding problem. 
 
The aforementioned limitations have brought about an important legal and 
institutional weakness, which hampers the advance in the regional integration scheme. 
Therefore, it is required to carry out a profound rationalization and reinforcement of the 
common Central American institutions.  
 
 
Comparing the common actions and policies encouraging integration  
 
The European experience has showed that a regional integration process has costs 
and benefits, but as a whole the net effect can be potentially positive. In order that this 
potentially positive effect materializes in practice, sensible backing policies are required 
(such as trade, macroeconomic and sector policies); otherwise, the potential benefits of 
regional integration can be reduced or removed. 
 
It is worthwhile noticing that the net benefits of integration are those ones 
becoming positive, that is, it is admitted that there will be winners and losers in the 
process. To a great extent, the magnitude of these redistributive effects will depend on the 
type of intraregional trade created after the beginning of the integration process. If that 
trade creation has a high component of intraindustry trade, the productive structure 
adjustment will be relatively costless and its effect on income distribution will be less 
severe. In case of predominance of this trade, member countries have only to bear the 
cost of eliminating some firms from some industries, without having to abandon entirely 
those industries. By contrast, interindustry trade involves the whole elimination of some 
industries in some member countries due to their moving to other member countries 
where comparative costs for these industries are the lowest in the regional market. 
 
The European integration scheme has proved that the gains can be sufficiently 
significant as to offset for the losses. The fact that the overall effect has been positive, it  15
has ensured the feasibility of compensatory policies. The standard way to carry out this 
compensation has been through financial solidarity materialized in the Structural Funds 
and the Cohesion Fund. By these Funds, a part of the Member States’ contributions to the 
EU budget have been transferred to the less favored social groups and regions. In the 
current 2000-2006 Financial Perspectives, the aforementioned Funds account for the third 
part of the EU budget. 
 
The backing and compensatory policies have been keys to success at the European 
model of economic integration. By contrast, the lack of these policies in the new CACM 
has accounted for most of its limitations. Unlike the European case, the new CACM has 
not been able to implement completely the basic backing policies to restore the customs 
union in the region and coordinate their members’ macroeconomic policies. As regards 
compensatory policies, these hardly exist in the new Central American integration 
scheme. 
 
Intraregional trade – an essential element for reactivating the customs union– 
remains limited within the total trade of the CACM. In the 2000-2004 period 
intraregional exports were not able to represent on average more than 26.7 per cent of 
total exports, while intraregional imports did not exceeded 13.5 per cent of total imports. 
These percentages are still far from those ones observed in the EU, where intraregional 




The dominance of extraregional trade explains why the economic policy of   
Central American governments has given priority to extraregional economic relations and 
in moments of conflict, has not favored the interests of the Central American integration 
scheme. If intraregional trade is wished to acquire more significance for the economic 
development of Central America, it is necessary to adopt measures favoring its 
expansion. Thus, measures such as the removal of the non-tariff barriers and the effective 
liberalization of  intraregional trade in primary products and services can help to achieve 
this objective.  
 
The creation of a customs union also involves the adoption of a common trade 
policy, since all the customs union members are bound to apply the same CET against 
third countries. Besides the existence of the CET compels that trade negotiations are 
carried out jointly, providing a potential benefit to the customs union members stemmed 
from the greater regional bargaining power. 
 
In customs unions made up of LDCs, as it is the case of the CACM, the 
possibility of using the greater regional bargaining power is singularly important because 
it allows taking part in better conditions in international trade relations. However, the 
Central American countries have scarcely used this power. They have tended to negotiate 
bilaterally their free trade agreements, eroding the common dimension of the tariff 
protection guaranteed by the CET. Even when the Central American countries have 
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negotiated free trade agreements en bloc –as it was done with the Dominican Republic 
and the US–, harmonized joint agreements were only reached regarding procedures, 
while the tariff concessions were negotiated bilaterally, taking into consideration the 
peculiarities and the sensitive products of every country. 
 
The absence of a real common trade policy not only has prevented CACM 
members from taking advantage of the potential regional bargaining power, but also it 
can endanger progress made in the CET harmonization. The problem arises when 
simultaneously establishing a CET with a series of bilateral free trade agreements 
including different tariff concessions. The entry into force of the US – Central  America 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) will give clear proof of this problem, since it will not 
take place in a homogeneous way in all the Central American countries. Tariff 
concessions were negotiated bilaterally, what means that the schedule of tariff exemption 
in the CAFTA will be different in every country and therefore, the CET will not be 
applied in its entirety by all the countries during the period of tariff exemption. The fact 
that the US is the principal trade partner of the CACM, providing around 40 per cent of 
its total imports,
25  converts to the CET exceptions originated by the CAFTA 
implementation, into a potential disturbing factor of the Central American customs union. 
The potentiality of this disturbance will become effective if governments do not come to 
an agreement to harmonize the differences in the CAFTA tariff concessions and to make 
them compatible with the establishment of the CET.  
 
Likewise, the weakness of the common trade policy in the CACM can hinder the 
conclusion of the current process of CET harmonization. If the aforementioned problem 
on CAFTA coming into force is left aside, the current percentage of the tariff universe 
remaining to be harmonized is small (5.4 per cent).
26 Nonetheless, its harmonization can 
be complex because tariffed agricultural products are included. For this type of products, 
a renegotiation both in the list of products and in the tariff levels, as well as in the quotas, 
could be required within the framework of the WTO. In other words, it would be 
necessary to renegotiate commitments assumed by every country as part of its admission 
into the WTO, for what it would be advisable to rely on a regional bargaining power. 
 
Along with the common trade policy, the common customs administration is 
another element inseparable from the formation and operation of a customs union. Not 
only the CET has to be applied against third countries in equal terms by all the CACM 
members, but also it has to be collected and administered jointly. The CET collection is a 
source of community revenues, which can be allocated to the financing of common 
policies consolidating and deepening the economic integration process. 
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For now, the advances in the setting up of a customs administration strictly 
common are limited, what can be conditioning the effective establishment of the customs 
union. Progresses are only perceived in the binational customs between Guatemala and El 
Salvador. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to eliminate all the intraregional customs, 
keeping only the peripheral customs model until becoming the type of customs which is 
typical of a customs union.
27 
 
Given the budgetary restriction of the Central American governments, a 
significant issue is to delimit the use of the revenues collected in the peripheral customs, 
once intraregional customs are removed. These revenues include both the tariff incomes 
and the domestic taxes on imported goods collected at the customs. That is why it is 
important to find suitable mechanisms of  tax harmonization as well as of collection and 
distribution of  the CET revenues received by the peripheral customs. A coherent 
proposal  would be that such revenues financed a community budget from which 
common policies could be developed. Nonetheless, for the time being  the Central 
American governments are reluctant to this idea. 
 
Macroeconomic stability is another requirement for laying down a customs union 
on a sound basis. A way of contributing to this stability is the coordination of the major 
macroeconomic policies of the countries participating in the customs union. Besides, this 
coordination is fundamental to avoid that the measures adopted by every member country 
to adjust to the international economy changes, end up affecting unfavorably on the rest 
of the partners. 
 
The empirical evidence suggests the fulfillment degree of the macroeconomic 
convergence criteria established by the Central American Monetary Council has been 
modest in the new CACM.
28 In the 1997–2004 periods the average fulfillment degree did 
not exceed 34 per cent in Honduras and Nicaragua, was around 50 per cent in Costa Rica 
and Guatemala, and reached almost 66 per cent in El Salvador.
29 Although all the CACM 
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members have been applying similar macroeconomic stabilization and structural 
adjustment policies, the degrees and speeds of implementation of these policies have 
been different in each country, what explains the disparity in the macroeconomic 
convergence? 
 
The real possibilities that this limited macroeconomic policies coordination will 
be extended and deepened appear to be still very reduced, since regional commitments 
continue occupying a secondary position among governments’ national priorities. In the 
medium term it is not predictable that a political commitment at the regional will be 
undertaken to coordinate macroeconomic policies and fulfill convergence criteria. 
 
In sum, the little relative importance of intraregional trade, the absence of a real 
common trade policy, the lack of a common customs administration and the limited 
coordination of macroeconomic policies explain why the economic integration process in 
Central America has not been accompanied by the appropriate backing policies. In this 
context, the prospect that the potentially positive effect of the new CACM materializes in 
practice, is very scarce. 
 
As to compensatory policies, these are practically non-existent in the new CACM 
despite the presence of important intraregional asymmetries. The empirical evidence 
points out that the relatively more developed Central American countries –that is, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala– are in better conditions to enjoy the potential benefits 
from the consolidation of the new CACM. Most of the growth in intraregional trade and 




If the new regional integration scheme is to endure in Central America, it must be 
perceived to be equitable by all the member countries, specially by Honduras and 
Nicaragua. Without additional measures paying attention to specific needs of the 
relatively less developed countries, it  is almost inevitable that these countries begin to 
question their participation in the new CACM. It would be appropriate to design 
mechanisms that enabled that the potential winners of the Central American customs 
union creation compensated the potential losers of the same. The European experience on 
intraregional solidarity could be adapted to the peculiarities of the Central American case, 
giving rise to some kind of structural and social cohesion instrument. For the present 
time, the interest of the Central American presidents in this type of mechanisms to 
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The European model of economic integration has become an unavoidable reference for 
any project of regional integration. Nevertheless, in the case of projects involving LDCs 
–as the CACM– it is advisable to use the European reference with caution, since there are 
important structural differences between both regional groupings. Furthermore, the 
theoretical basis of the European model is of limited relevance to assess the CACM as it 
refers to a theoretical framework which has been biased largely towards the study of the 
problems of economic integration among developed countries. 
 
Despite this, some features of the praxis of the European economic integration 
provide useful guidelines for the new CACM. In this regard, it is worthwhile highlighting 
that the European experience suggests that: 
 
a)  The political commitment is a basic precondition which has to be fulfilled in order 
for economic integration to advance. 
 
b)  The legal and institutional system is an important mechanism of economic 
integration. In the European case the Community law has given rise to a 
supranational legal system, which has allowed a gradual approach of the national 
legislations in economic matters. Likewise, the common institutions endowed 
with a supranational decision making power, a clear mandate and a certain 
amount of automatically available financial resources, have helped to pursue 
clearly identified common interests rather than the sometimes conflicting interests 
of different Member States. 
 
c)  The backing policies –such as trade, macroeconomic and sector policies– and  the 
compensatory policies –such as structural funds and social cohesion instruments– 
are keys for the potentially positive net effects of economic integration to 
materialize in practice. 
 
d)  Flexibility in the process of regional integration is essential to adapt it to changing 
historical circumstances, as well as to take into account the different speeds of 
progress at a subregional level. 
 
The evolution of the new regionalism in Central America differs substantially 
from this European experience. The new CACM has been reactivated without a strong 
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and sustained political commitment and with a weak legal and institutional framework. 
Likewise, the new CACM has not been able to implement completely the basic backing 
policies to restore the customs union in the region and coordinate their members’ 
macroeconomic policies. As regards compensatory policies, these hardly exist in the new 
integration scheme. Without additional measures paying attention to specific needs of the 
relatively less developed Central American countries – that is, Honduras and Nicaragua–, 
the potential benefits from the new regionalism will be concentrated on the relatively 
more developed ones, aggravating the intraregional asymmetries. 
 
All these factors account for the serious limitations of the new CACM. If these 
limitations are not overcome by implementing sensible economic and institutional 
policies such as the ones suggested in the paper, the new CACM will not be able to 
contribute effectively to the process of economic development in Central America. 
 